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GETTING STARTED: CREATING NEW
COMPETITION POLICY INSTITUTIONS IN
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
William E. Kovacic"
INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1970s, nearly forty transition economies
have created new competition policy systems or retooled dormant antimonopoly laws.' A dozen or so other nations seeking
to replace central planning with market processes also are
considering the adoption of new competition legislation.2 Encouraged by multinational donors and advisory bodies such as
the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and motivated to participate in international agreements such as the Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation, still more transition countries are likely
to follow.'
* Professor, George Mason University School of Law. I am grateful to
Kathryn Fenton, Eleanor Fox, Robert Lande, Armando Rodriguez, Luis Tineo,
Michael Trebilcock, and Spencer W. Waller for many useful comments. I also am
indebted to James Anderson, John Bentley, Linda Boner, Roger Boner, Charles
Cadwell, Cynthia Clement, Karen Turner Dunn, Andrew Gavil, Gary Kelly, Shyam
Khemani, Georges Korsun, Robert LaMont, Gerald Meyerman, Larry Morgan, Karen Mills, William Nielsen, Mancur Olson, Malcolm Russell-Einhorn, Ben Slay,
Robert Thorpe, and Thomas Timberg, who have shared their insights while collaborating on projects to design and implement competition and consumer protection
laws in transition economies. The Center for Law and Economics at the George
Mason University School of Law generously supported the research for this Article.
1. Mark Palim's study of new competition policy systems identifies 39 countries that meet this description. See Mark R.A. Palim, The Growth of Competition
Law in the Global Economy 185-205 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George
Mason University) (on file with author). These are Albania, Algeria, Argentina,
Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia,
Gabon, Georgia, Hungary, India, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, South
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Zambia.
2. In Latin America and the Caribbean alone, these countries include Bolivia,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Trinidad, and Tobago. See Luis
TINEO, COMPETITION POLICY & LAW IN LATIN AERICA FROM DISTRIEBUTIVE REGU-

LATIONS TO MARKET EFFICIENCY 8-9 (Monterey Inst., Ctr. for Trade & Com. Dipl.,
Working Paper No. 4, 1997) (on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
Other candidates are Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, and Vietnam.
3. See Palim, supra note 1, at 87-88 (describing role of international organi-
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The effort given to adopting competition statutes in transition economies has obscured the grave difficulties that most
nations have experienced in implementing them. Few countries
have created vibrant competition policy institutions or executed effective enforcement programs. Resource-starved enforcement agencies often are assigned to execute ambitious legal
commands amid powerful economic and political opposition.
The new enforcement authorities seldom can tap a large body
of indigenous competition policy expertise, and their work
must withstand review before courts with little or no understanding of market processes. Because foreign donors often
treat passing a new statute as the chief benchmark of progress
in law reform, and commonly view implementation as an afterthought, many new competition systems have been dead or are
gasping on arrival.
Adopting moribund competition laws with no means or
realistic strategy for effective implementation is not a harmless
exercise. In transition economies, the process of drafting and
enacting hollow legal commands consumes precious human
and political capital that otherwise might be used to solve
pressing problems of transition.4 Establishing unenforceable or
erratically applied laws increases uncertainty and risk for
private entrepreneurs operating in what already are precarious
and unpredictable business conditions. For the public, empty
legal reforms feed cynicism about the rule of law and the value
of economic and political decentralization.
This Article explores how transition economies can design

zations in promoting the adoption of competition laws in transition economies).
4. In many transition economies, a relatively small number of government
officials are responsible for administering economic reform programs that involve a
wide array of initiatives. See William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing
Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197,
1213 (1995) [hereinafter Kovacic, Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms].
Officials assigned to deal with matters related to competition policy might handle
issues involving antitrust, consumer protection, foreign investment, intellectual
property, and trade. Managing this demanding portfolio involves participation in
frequent meetings with multinational committees and task forces, regular consultation with representatives of donor organizations and other foreign advisors, preparation of specific reform measures, and navigating reforms through the transition
country's political process. This places heavy burdens on the cadre of transition
economy officials who have experience with and formal training in market economics and related legal policies. The time of these officials is precious, and distractions are costly. I am indebted to Luis Tineo for this point.
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and implement effective competition programs in the face of
strong political opposition, limited legal and economic expertise, and resource austerity. The Article draws on two principal
sources of information. The first is my experience with drafting
and implementing competition and consumer protection laws
for transition economy governments. 5 The second consists of
discussions with transition economy experts who have shared
their views about designing or implementing new competition
systems.6
The Article begins by identifying institutional foundations
for effective competition programs in Western countries whose
advisors have helped design new systems for transition economy governments. A review of conditions that facilitate successful programs in established market economies helps illuminate
obstacles that transition governments are likely to encounter
in creating their own competition policy systems.
Part II of the Article examines barriers to implementation
that transition economy law drafters and their external advisors should consider in preparing new competition laws. In
contrast to the Western countries whose laws often provide
models for new competition statutes, transition economies
feature few of the institutions that support effective
policymaking and enforcement. Transition economy governments often must build the requisite institutions from the
ground up.
Part III considers how an assessment of obstacles to implementation should influence the design of new statutes for transition economies. Part III proposes that new competition laws
properly account for the likely ability of new government entities to enforce them effectively. For most transition economies,
such an approach would dictate use of a gradualist strategy by

5. Since 1992, I have participated in competition or consumer protection law
projects for the governments of Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Mongolia, Morocco,
Nepal, Russia, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
6. I am indebted to M. Balihyuu, Kul Ratna Bhurtyal, Beatriz Boza,
Abderrahim Boazza, Alfredo Bullard, Vadimir Capelik, Mario Cuevas, Claudia
Curiel, Dang Duc Dam, Praveen Dixit, Le Dang Doanh, Lorena Duke, Ramesh
Dunghel, Celina Escolon, Slava Fetalava, Anna Fornalczyk, Eduardo Garmendia,
Prakash Ghimire, Shalva Gogiashvii, Phan Thanh Ha, Nguyen Ngoc Hien, Ana
Julia Jatar, Kakha Kvitsiani, Ketevan Lapachi, Vazha Maisuradze, Olexander
Melnichenko, Svitlana Moroz, Normin Pakpahan, Nguyen Dinh Tai, and Alexander
Zavada.
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which the country enacts a small number of legal commands
and focuses early implementation efforts on building the new
competition policy agency, conducting education and publicity
programs, and performing case studies. Only after these activities "werewell underway would the new agency begin a modest
program of law enforcement.
In practice, few transition economies have used law drafting and implementation strategies for competition policy that
are consciously gradualist. In the typical case, the initial design of competition laws overlooks vital implementation issues
and overwhelms transition country institutional capabilities.
Part IV suggests how new competition agencies can adapt
excessively ambitious statutes to their own implementation
capabilities. Part IV also presents a strategy for building needed institutional capability while executing antimonopoly programs that promise to improve economic performance and
withstand political counterattacks.
I.

INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR COMPETITION PROGRAMS
IN WESTERN ECONOMIES

The substantive requirements and enforcement mechanisms of most transition economy competition laws strongly
reflect the influence of Western models.' For example, new
competition laws frequently address the full range of behavior
treated under Western antitrust statutes and jurisprudence,
including horizontal restraints, vertical restraints, single-firm
exclusionary conduct, and mergers.8 The transition economy

7. See Vladimir Capelik & Ben Slay, Antimonopoly Policy and Monopoly
Regulation in Russia, in DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY IN POSTCOMMNIST ECONOMIES 57, 62 (Ben Slay ed., 1996) [hereinafter DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION] (describing Russia's antimonopoly law as "a mixture of

European and American competition policies"); Ben Slay, Industrial De-monopoliza.
tion and Competition Policy in Poland, in DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION

123, 134 [hereinafter Slay, Industrial De-monopolization] (discussing European
Union influence on Poland's antimonopoly law); Derrick McKoy, Antitrust Law in
Jamaica: The Fair Competition Act of 1993, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 183, 185
(1995) (observing that Jamaica's Fair Competition Act is modeled after the
Sherman Act).
8. See Roger A. Boner, Competition Policy and Institutions in Reforming
Economies, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORi: A COiPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
38, 42-48 (Claudio R. Frischtak ed., 1996) [hereinafter REGULATORY POLICIES AND
REFOI i] (describing the main elements of transition economy competition laws);
Russell Pittman, Some Critical Provisions in the Antimonopoly Laws of Central
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laws often design their new competition agencies along Western lines and place public enforcement authority in entities
that are independent of existing government ministries and
the office of the country's chief executive.9 In most countries,
the judiciary plays an important role in implementing the new
laws, either by serving as the decisionmakdng tribunal of the
first instance or by exercising appellate review over the rulings
of the competition agency.'0
The strong Western orientation of transition economy
competition systems results largely from the firm encouragement or insistence of Western advisors and donor groups who
assist the transition governments in drafting new laws. Funded by multinational bodies such as the OECD, UNCTAD, and
the World Bank and by national groups such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), competition policy
experts from Canada, the European Union (EU), and the United States have played a major role in shaping transition economy competition statutes." Transition economy governments
have incorporated the main elements of Western regimes into
their competition systems-including broad-based substantive
commands, institutional independence for the enforcement
agency, and extensive judicial involvement in the implementation of the statute-because Western advisors and donors have
urged them to do so.'
and Eastern Europe, 26 INT'L LAW. 485, 487-502 (1992) (describing substantive
prohibitions in Central and Eastern European antitrust laws); Tineo, supra note 2,
at 15-23 (describing substantive provisions of Latin American antitrust laws).
9. See Slay, Industrial De-monopolization, supra note 7, at 123, 134-35 (describing the status and structure of the Polish Antimonopoly Office); Tineo, supra
note 2, at 26-27 (describing status and structure of Latin American competition
agencies).
10. See Capelik & Slay, supra note 7, at 65 (describing appellate review in
Russia's antimonopoly system; noting concern of Russian antimonopoly officials
that decisions of reviewing courts "are frequently made in ignorance of the basic
requirements of competition policy (not to mention basic economics)"); TINEO, supra
note 2, at 30-31 (describing process for judicial review in many Latin American
competition systems).
11. See TINEO, supra note 2, at 4-5 (describing foreign technical assistance for
the development of competition policy systems in Latin America).
12. For example, the European Union (EU) has shaped the development of
competition laws in Central and Eastern Europe by its insistence that countries
desiring membership in the EU enact statutes that follow the EU competition
model. See JOHN FINGLETON, ELEANOR M. FOX, DAMIEN NEVEN, & PAUL
SEABRIGHT, COMPETITION POLICY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE
54-57 (1996) (discussing the EU's influence on competition laws in the Czech Re-
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In suggesting that transition governments embrace Western models, Western advisors often overlook two important
features of Western experience with competition law. First,
Western advisors sometimes presume that the transition country already possesses, or readily can construct, the institutional foundations on which successful Western competition systems rest. As discussed in Part II below, 3 many of these institutional foundations are feeble or nonexistent in transition
economies.
Second, Western advisors lose sight of how long it took for
competition systems to take root in their own countries. In
many Western countries, new competition policy systems grew
slowly and experienced serious difficulties in their formative
years. The failure to account for problems in establishing new
regulatory regimes in any national setting leads foreign donors
and their consultants to develop unrealistic expectations about
how quickly transition economy governments can establish
new competition systems.
By underestimating the magnitude of the implementation
task, Western donors invest too few resources in long-term
projects to train and counsel new competition agencies and to
assist transition governments in building collateral institutions
on which an agency's success depends. The discussion below
addresses important aspects of Western experience that receive
inadequate attention when Western donors and consultants
advise transition economies about creating competition systems.
A.

Institutional Foundations for Western Competition Law
Systems

Western competition agencies derive their effectiveness
from a number of conditions that directly and indirectly determine their ability to devise and execute competition programs. 4

public, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia); Palim, supra note 1, at 58-65 (documenting
how the EU has induced countries in Central and Eastern Europe to modify their
competition laws to copy the EU model); Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and
Antitrust Law in Central Europe: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, 15 MxCH. J. INrL L. 1129, 1149-56 (1994) (describing how the prospect of
EU membership has reshaped competition laws in Central Europe).
13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. See Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 582-90 (1994) (cau-
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1. Substantial Resources
A vital condition supporting the maintenance of robust
competition systems in Western countries is that public enforcement authorities receive substantial funding for personnel
and facilities. Resource levels vary across national enforcement
agencies, and Western agencies are not immune from funding
cuts that curtail the scope and volume of their enforcement
programs. 5 Nonetheless, Western competition authorities typically receive legislative appropriations or user fees that permit
them to hire large numbers of capable professionals and administrators and maintain a substantial, credible enforcement
presence in the business community. 6
2. Academic Infrastructure
Competition systems in Western countries depend heavily
on academic institutions for two contributions to the implementation of antitrust laws. First, Western universities train
many students in the law and economics of competition policy.
Several hundred Western universities have law schools that
teach sophisticated courses in antitrust or have economics
departments or business schools that teach undergraduate and
graduate courses dealing with microeconomics and industrial
organization. Instructors in such courses can choose from a
multitude of teaching materials that incorporate the latest
developments in analytical techniques and policy. Western
competition agencies recruit numerous entry-level attorneys

tioning against efforts to export U.S. antitrust laws to other countries, explaining
that U.S. antitrust law reflects a distinctive social and legal vision that cannot
readily be transferred to other nations); Andrew I. Gavil, Competition and Cooperation on Sherman Island: An Antitrust Ethnography, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1225,
1232-49 (1995) (describing how distinctive cultural features have shaped competition policy in the U.S.).
15. See William E. Kovacic, Public Choice and the Public Interest: Federal
Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement during the Reagan Administration, 33
ANTITRUST BULL. 467, 499-500 (1988) (discussing impact of Reagan-era budget cuts
on Federal Trade Commission antitrust activity).
16. For Fiscal Year 1996, President Clinton's budget request for the antitrust
activities of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
totalled $143.3 million, including $96.5 million that the two agencies receive in
premerger notification fees. See President Proposes Increased Funding for Both
Antitrust Enforcement Agencies, 68 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 168
(1995).
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and economists from these programs.
As their second contribution, Western universities generate large amounts of research and commentary that address
phenomena relevant to competition policy. Supplementing the
work of universities are countless institutes and think tanks.
Numerous scholarly journals publish papers on antitrust and
industrial organization topics, and such journals are widely
accessible to government officials and practitioners. The academic community is the equivalent of a large network of competition policy research and development laboratories that
supplies the antitrust system.
3. Accessible Information Networks
Western competition agencies rely on sophisticated information systems to disseminate policy guidance and report
enforcement activities. Government agencies in Western countries routinely publish enforcement guidelines, advisory opinions, and various forms of educational material. 7 Such material is distributed through a variety of information conduits,
including an expanding array of electronic media. Western
countries have numerous publications that regularly report on
developments in competition policy and other forms of business
regulation. In short, Western enforcement authorities have
relatively little difficulty making their enforcement preferences
and decisions known to key external constituencies such as the
business community and their advisors. Moreover, the diversity and inquisitiveness of media organizations inject an important element of transparency and accountability into the operation of competition policy agencies.
4. Professional Associations
To operate effectively, government agencies must inform
affected constituencies about the requirements of the law and
their enforcement intentions. Knowledge of the law helps consumers and business operators to understand their obligations
and assert their rights. In Western countries, professional
associations supply valuable networks through which govern17. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 63739, 724-27 (4th ed., 1997) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS] (describing
the advisory activities of FTC and the Justice Department).
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ment enforcement agencies transmit information about competition law developments to firms and consumers.
Professional groups such as bar associations and industry
associations provide valuable links between competition agencies and external communities, including business managers.
Bodies such as the American Bar Association (ABA) and its
Section of Antitrust Law provide important networks through
which the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) antitrust officials convey information about current and
contemplated enforcement initiatives and policies. In the United States alone, professional associations and other non-government organizations each year sponsor dozens of seminars
on competition policy at the national, state, and local levels.
Federal antitrust enforcement officials regularly speak at these
programs, whose attendees include numerous attorneys and
business managers. The organized bar and other professional
groups perform a valuable function in the antitrust system by
disseminating information about government policies and instructing business operators about how to comply with the law.
Such groups also facilitate a continuing process of critical discourse about antitrust policy that makes the rationale and
of government enforcement decisions more transpareffects
18
ent.
5. Sound Judicial System
The judiciary plays a major role in antitrust enforcement
in most Western countries, either by deciding cases in the first
instance or reviewing appeals from rulings by administrative
competition commissions. 9 In the United States, for example,
federal antitrust cases are tried before federal judges who
decide many cases involving business issues, including compe18. On the importance of professional bodies in disseminating antitrust policy
information and fostering debate about competition issues, see William E. Kovacic,
Creating Competition Policy: Betty Bock and the Development of Antitrust Institutions, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 1997).
19. See ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 468-72 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing the judiciary's role in

elaborating antitrust standards in the United States); Thomas M. Kauper, The
Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 90 (1990) ("Antitrust has a large cast. The central role is played
by the federal courts and, more particularly, the Supreme Court of the United
States").
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tition policy disputes. Episodes of corruption or misconduct

involving federal judges are exceedingly rare. Both the government and the business community generally regard the courts
as honest and fair forums for adjudicating antitrust cases.
6. Legal Process Safeguards
Western competition authorities operate by elaborate systems of procedural rules that require transparency and ensure
fairness in the formation and execution of policy. 2° Western
agencies follow long-established traditions of seeking public
commentary on contemplated adjustments in enforcement policy. Antimonopoly agency personnel also are bound by a

large collection of laws that prohibit corrupt behavior and

otherwise seek to remove incentives for government officials to
exercise
their discretion in ways that betray the public inter22
est.
7. Accessibility and Availability of Business Records
Western antitrust law enforcement agencies have extensive power to compel private firms to submit records or other
data for examination. 2 Compulsory process is a vital element
of law enforcement in Western countries.'M Although firms

20. For example, the FTC is bound by various procedural rules that seek to
ensure fairness and integrity in its administrative adjudicatory activities. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENS, supra note 17, at 613-18 (reviewing FTC adjudication

procedures). Both U.S. federal antitrust agencies must abide by transparency safeguards when settling cases. See id. at 618-19, 690-92 (describing procedures gov-

erning settlements by the FTC and the entry of consent decrees in antitrust cases
brought by the Justice Department).
21. See Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report of the Federal Trade Corn.
mission on Competition in the 21st Century (May 1996) (presenting results of FTC
hearings in 1995 to solicit views about appropriate adjustments in enforcement
policy concerning global competition, efficiency, and innovation issues); European
Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EU Competition Policy,
COM(96)721 (Jan. 1997) (EU policy paper soliciting views on possible changes in
EU policies governing distribution practices) (visited Aug. 4, 1997)
<http:/europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/ententeten/9672len.htm>.
22. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202 (1997) (limiting the receipt of gifts by U.S.
government officials); 5 C.F.R. § 2635.402 (1997) (addressing financial conflicts of
interest involving U.S. government officials); 5 C.F.R. § 2635.801 (1997) (restricting
outside activities by U.S. government officials).
23. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 17, at 664-76 (describing
the Justice Department's information-gathering powers in antitrust matters).
24. See generally Symposium, Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger En-
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sometimes destroy or conceal data subject to legitimate government requests, episodes of such misconduct seem to be relatively uncommon. Having a legal tradition by which government information requests ordinarily are honored, subject to
occasional challenge and review before the courts, greatly facilitates effective law enforcement. The development of sophisticated accounting and information systems within companies
also increases the likelihood that data provided in response to
compulsory process requests will supply a meaningful perspective on the operation of the firm.
8. Political Environment Conducive to Market Processes
Competition agencies in Western countries operate in a
political environment where price controls, public ownership of
enterprises, and government controls on the entry of new firms
are exceptional rather than routine. In most Western countries, competition authorities enjoy the benefit of a broadlybased political and social presumption that rivalry among
private enterprises is the best guarantor that consumers will
receive "fair" prices, satisfactory quality, and adequate information on which to base purchasing decisions. Western economies sometimes depart substantially from reliance upon market processes, and competition authorities in these countries
devote resources to discouraging government intervention that
substitutes central direction for business rivalry as the organizing force in the economy. Nonetheless, compared to their
transition economy counterparts, Western competition authorities are compelled to spend considerably less energy defending
the basic premises of a market system.
B.

Expectations About the Speed of Implementation:
Perspectivesfrom Western Experience

Western technical assistance programs usually underestimate the effort required to establish new competition systems.
This miscalculation results partly from a tendency to forget the
time and effort required for new competition institutions to

forcement, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 813 (1997) (articles discussing the operation of the
U.S. premerger notification mechanism and the importance of mandatory information disclosure requirements for U.S. merger enforcement).
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take root in many Western countries. Western advisors and
the donors who fund them sometimes appear to assume, at
least implicitly, that transition economy governments can build
in a few years institutions which Western countries required
decades to establish as effective law enforcement bodies.
Studying the experience of well-established market economies in creating new competition systems would help Western
advisors develop realistic expectations for their transition economy clients. The United States provides an informative illustration. Early government enforcement of the Sherman Act'
encountered ominous judicial resistance and suffered from
executive branch indifference. In 1895, in its first interpretation of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court handed the Justice Department a stunning defeat in United States v. E.C.
Knight Co.,26 which threatened to eviscerate the statute's ban
against monopolization." The government did not achieve
Supreme Court victories in applying the Sherman Act's prohibitions against agreements in restraint of trade' and monopolization 9 until 1897 and 1904, respectively."
More striking is the turbulent beginning of the FTC,
whose independent status often is proposed by Western advisors as a model for transition economy competition enforcement bodies. Formed in 1914, the Commission was afflicted
from the start by insipid leadership. Louis Brandeis, the FTC's

25. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)).
26. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
27. In Knight, the Supreme Court rejected the government's challenge to a
series of mergers that combined 98% of the country's sugar refining capacity. The
Court ruled that "manufacturing" was not "commerce" under the statute and the
Sherman Act thus did not apply to the mergers. 156 U.S. at 12. Commentators
interpreted Knight to permit mergers to monopoly in manufacturing industries. See
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 333 (1977). The outcome in Knight

pleased the head of President Grover Cleveland's Justice Department. In a letter
to a friend, Attorney General Richard Olney said "[y]ou will observe that the government has been defeated in the Supreme Court on the trust question. I always
supposed it would be, and have taken the responsibility of not prosecuting under a
law I believe to be no good ..
COURAGE 671 (1932).

" ALAN

NEVINS, GROVER CLEvELAND: A STUDY IN

28. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
29. Id. at § 2.
30. In two cases involving railroads, the Supreme Court struck down a horizontal price-fixing agreement under § 1 of the Sherman Act in United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341-42 (1987), and invalidated a merger under § 2 of the statute in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 325-54 (1904).
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chief architect, called President Woodrow Wilson's early appointments to the agency "'a stupid administration." 3 ' The
Commission's inability to pursue a substantial antitrust program in its first decade led contemporary observers to view the
agency as ill-suited to perform a useful competition policy
role."
In the few instances in which the Commission used its
powers aggressively, it encountered hostility in Congress and
the federal courts. In the early 1920s, Congress condemned the
FTC for issuing a study that accused the nation's largest
meatpackers of various anticompetitive acts. 3 Congress
threatened the FTC's existence and withdrew its jurisdiction to
address competition concerns involving meatpackers. 4 The
episode demonstrated the political hazards to a new competition policy institution of using its authority to challenge politically powerful economic interests. 5
The most sobering feature of the FTC's early experience
was its unwelcome reception in the courts. 5 The FTC was the
federal government's second independent regulatory commission," an innovation in public administration that combined
functions previously dedicated to the executive branch, the
judiciary, and the legislature. In Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act," Congress gave the agency a broad mandate
to proscribe "unfair methods of competition" 9 and intended
that the FTC use a broad mix of policymaking tools, including

31. Arthur S. Link, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIE ERA 1910-1917,
at 74 (1954).
32. See id. at 75.
33. See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional
Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 623-25 (1982) (discussing
congressional reaction to the FTC's meatpacking investigation and report).
34. Id. at 624.
35. See E. PENDLETON HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 118 (1936) (congressional reaction to the FTC's meatpacking study provided "a concrete illustration of the political and administrative problems involved
in attempting to regulate a powerful industry").
36. See Kovacic, supra note 33, at 611-16 (discussing pattern of FTC defeats
in the federal courts in the 1910s and 1920s).
37. The Interstate Commerce Commission, created in 1887, had been the first.
38. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15

U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994)).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 5. The aims of Congress in adopting this provision are analyzed in Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of 'Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 231-38 (1980).
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administrative adjudication and the publication of reports, to
establish new principles of competition policy. 0
Ambitious congressional expectations about the FTC's
competition policy role were soon dashed in the courts. In its
early years, the FTC received little sympathy from a federal
judiciary that found scant evidence of superior expertise in the
Commission's sketchy opinions and otherwise begrudged vesting broad adjudication responsibilities in the new institution.4' From the early 1920s through the mid-1930s, the federal courts issued decisions that severely limited the FTC's
power to define new standards of commercial conduct, to compel the production of business records, and to impose remedies
to restore competition. Not until the 1960s, fully fifty years
after the Commission's creation, did the FTC obtain Supreme
Court rulings that clearly sustained the broad grant of
policymaking authority embodied in the 1914 statute.43
An important lesson from Western experience is that creating new competition policy institutions can be a difficult,
gradual process, particularly where the institutions alter the
government's political structure and redistribute power among
government bodies. Forming new entities for public administration is difficult under the best of circumstances, much less
in an environment lacking the supporting institutions-such as
well-established professional associations, a broad reservoir of
relevant substantive expertise and research, and deeply-in-

40. Senator Francis Newlands, one of the chief sponsors of the FTC Act, observed during the legislative debates on the statute that it was "expected that as
a result of investigation and as a result of long experience [the Commission] will
build up a body of information and of administrative law that will be of service
not only to them but to the country itself, and that gradually standards will be
established that will be accepted and will constitute our code of business morals."
51 CONG. REC. 11083 (1914) (statement of Senator Newlands).
41. See CARL MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1920-1930, at 92-99 (1933)

(describing how federal courts embraced restrictive interpretations of the powers of
the FTC). McFarland's study shows that the ICC faced similar judicial opposition
when it sought to perform its assigned adjudicatory responsibilities. Id. at 102-24.
The FTC's poor record in the courts was attributable partly to its failure to provide well-reasoned rationales for its decisions. See GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE

334 (1924).
42. See Kovacic, supra note 33, at 611-16 (describing judicial decisions from
1920 through 1934 that narrowed the FTC's authority).
43. See id. at 616 & n.143 (describing Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s
that adopted a more expansive view of the FTC's authority).
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grained traditions that favor market processes-that help a
new competition agency prosper. It is difficult to imagine that
transition economy governments could significantly improve
upon the timetable by which new competition bodies have
taken shape in Western countries."
II. OBSTACLES

TO

IMPLEMENTATION

IN

TRANSITION

ECONOMIES

Most transition economy competition laws are breathtaking in their complexity and scope. New transition economy
statutes often include the full range of antitrust prohibitions
found in Western systems,4 5 and many laws curb business
torts, misappropriation of intellectual property, deceptive advertising, and fraudulent market practices.4" The impulse to
do everything at once results from pressure from donor organizations and foreign advisors who think it best to build a comprehensive framework from the start, and from fears the transition country reformers will have one chance to get the law
44. I have used the example of the United States, but the antitrust histories
of Australia and Canada also would demonstrate the point. Australian antitrust
policy originated in 1906 with a law aimed at foreign producers of agricultural
equipment. Early judicial rulings rendered the measure ineffective. Antitrust policy
in Australia remained dormant for decades. In the 1960s the government required
the registration of restrictive business practices, and in 1974 Australia adopted its
current law, the Trade Practices Act. See Roger A. Boner & Reinald Krueger, The
Basics of Antitrust Policy: A Review of Ten Nations and the European Communities
41-42 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 160, 1991). Canada enacted an antitrust
law in 1889, but enforcement under the statute was infrequent and ineffective
until passage of a new statute in 1986. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Evolution
of Competition Policy: A Comparative Perspective, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
COMPETITION POLICY 1, 3 (Frank Mathewson et al. eds., 1990); Paul Collins & D.
Jeffrey Brown, National Antitrust Laws in a Continental Economy: A Comparison
of Canadian and American Antitrust Laws, 65 ANTTrRUST L.J. 495, 497-503 (1997).
45. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
46. See Capelik & Slay, supra note 7, at 68-69 (describing responsibility of
Russia's antimonopoly agency for monitoring protection of intellectual property
rights and implementing measures to protect consumer rights); William E. Kovacic
& Robert S. Thorpe, Antitrust and the Evolution of a Market Economy in Mongolia, in DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION 107, 100-01 (describing consumer protection and intellectual property provisions of Mongolia's antimonopoly law); Adam
Torok, Competition Policy and De-monopolization in Hungary After 1990, in DEMONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION 24, 34 (describing consumer protection duties of
Hungary's Office of Competition); Roger W. Mastalir, Regulation of Competition in
the 'New" Free Markets of Eastern Europe: A Comparative Study of Antitrust Laws
in Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics, and their Models, 19 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 61, 74-75, 81-82 (1993).
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right and therefore should include everything the first time
around. Execution of the ambitious legal commands usually is
entrusted to a new agency having none or few of the institutional advantages of the Western countries on whose laws and
regulations the transition country's statute was modelled.
It is foolish to devise substantive legal commands without
accounting for the environment in which the commands will be
applied. Law drafters must make reasonable assumptions
about the current adequacy of institutions whose functioning is
essential to implementing the new legal commands. Where the
requisite institutions do not exist or are feeble, competition
agency enforcement programs will be unsustainable if they
outrun the development of supporting institutions.
A.

Unfavorable InitialConditions

Transition economy competition laws often are enacted in
circumstances that make it difficult for a new antitrust agency
to implement the statute's commands in a way that promotes
economic growth.47 Several initial conditions of the typical
reform environment impede the emergence of effective competition policy systems in transition economies.
1. Resource Austerity
Most transition economy governments have few resources
to fund new competition agencies. The leadership and professional staff often are paid meager wages, making it difficult for
the agency to retain skilled employees.48 New enforcement
institutions depend on assistance from foreign donors to acquire suitable office space and purchase basic office equipment
such as telephones, fax machines, copiers, and computers.
Developing a rudimentary communications and information
processing network for a new antimonopoly service can cost

47. See Boner, supra note 8, at 40 (observing that "in many reforming economies, market mechanisms and institutions may be absent or otherwise less effective."); A.E. Rodriguez & Malcolm Coate, Limits to Antitrust Policy for Reforming
Economies, 18 HOUSTON J. INVL L. 311, 338-45 (1996).
48. See William E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law
Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POLY 437, 441-43 (1996) [hereinafter Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur]
(discussing low wages paid to employees of transition economy competition agencies).
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$80,000 to $100,000.

The Antimonopoly Service of the Republic of Georgia provides a useful example. Established by presidential decree in
1992 as a department of the Ministry of the Economy and
reconstituted by statute as an independent agency in 1996, the
Antimonopoly Service (AMS) currently operates out of a single,
unheated room in a government office building in Tbilisi. Some
65 staff members rotate in and out of the cramped quarters,
which contain a few desks, chairs, and a single computer. The
national government has promised to relocate the AMS to
larger office space in Tbilisi, and two foreign donors have committed themselves to supply additional office equipment. Until
these promises are fulfilled, the new agency's ability to function effectively will be severely hampered.
2. Limited Indigenous Substantive Expertise
New transition economy agencies do not enjoy a vast pool
of specialists with academic training or practical experience in
the law or economics of competition policy.49 At best, a new
agency can hope to start with a handful of professionals with
relevant expertise who can guide the activities of colleagues
who are completely new to the area. A new agency will be
forced to devote great effort to training the professional staff
and coping with whirlwind turnover as private sector employers recruit agency lawyers and economists who have acquired
some familiarity with the legal and economic framework of a
market economy.
3. Frail Academic Infrastructure
The scarcity of competition policy expertise results substantially from the absence of an academic infrastructure that
teaches students about competition policy and generates research that informs government decisions. Universities in
many transition economies have only begun to retool their
curricula to incorporate market-oriented courses, hire instructors who understand the new fields, and produce teaching
materials in the host country's language. The establishment of

49. See id& at 452-60 (discussing limited background of many transition economy antimonopoly employees in law and economics of competition policy).
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a market-oriented academic system will proceed slowly where
incumbent faculty members and administrators oppose changes that will liquidate intellectual capital invested in mastering
the theory and practical techniques of a central command and
control economy. In many instances, the most expeditious and
effective path for training the next generation of scholars,
teachers, and public administrators will consist of sending
promising candidates for graduate training in Western universities.
4. Weak Professional Associations and Consumer Groups
Transition economies usually lack strong networks of professional associations and consumer groups through which
information about the content and process of a new legal regime ordinarily is disseminated in Western countries. In the
early stages of the transition process, there will be few indigenous lawyers with knowledge of business law. In the pre-transition period, bar associations, other professional bodies, and
consumer groups often were instruments of political control
rather than independent forums for analyzing and debating
legal developments. The transformation of bar associations and
other professional groups into strong networks for assimilating
and distributing information about competition policy will take
place only gradually over time.
5. Deficient Judicial Systems
The courts in most transition economies are inadequate
forums for resolving business disputes. Few transition economy
judges have any familiarity with market-oriented legal principles, much less an awareness of basic industrial organization
concepts that underpin competition policy."0 Courts in transition economies also are beset by extraordinary delays and
irregularities in processing cases. 5 Some judicial systems are
50. Some noteworthy exceptions exist. See William E. Kovacic, Competition
Policy, Economic Development, and the Transition to Free Markets in the Third
World: The Case of Zimbabwe, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 261-63 (1992) [hereinafter
Zimbabwe] (describing aspects of Zimbabwe's judiciary and commercial law jurisprudence that would facilitate implementation of a competition policy system).
51. See Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, Mexico's New Institutional Framework for
Antitrust Enforcement, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 1149, 1177 (1995) (observing that
Mexico's "judicial system is perceived by many as plagued with considerable de-
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deeply infected with corruption, and outcomes in litigated
disputes often hinge on the payment of bribes to judges and
court administrators.
A new competition system can compensate for these deficiencies partly by trying to minimize participation by the existing judiciary in the application of the law. This can be accomplished by giving the competition agency's decisions the force
of law and allowing affected parties to stay the operation of the
agency's orders only by appealing them to a higher tribunal. A
second approach is to create a special competition policy tribunal or business court to hear antitrust disputes. A third method is to establish special divisions within the existing judiciary
to handle antitrust matters. In no event can (or should) the
judiciary's involvement be eliminated, and all judicial participants in resolving antitrust cases-including members of special antimonopoly tribunals or business courts-will require
training. The urgency to provide training is especially acute
where the competition law provides a private right of action to
enforce the statute.52
6. Inadequate Limits on Administrative Discretion
The discretion of government agency decisionmakers in
transition economies seldom is confined by the collection of
rules that promote transparency, ensure fairness, and suppress
corruption in public administration in Western countries. Public officials in transition economies often operate with broad
grants of discretion and have no obligation to submit contemplated or completed policy actions for public review and commentary. Conflict of interest restrictions are relatively rare,
and small salaries induce many civil servants to accept second
jobs to supplement their government incomes. New competition
lays, institutional corruption and a lack of independence"); see also generally JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (Malcolm Rowat et al. eds.,
World Bank Technical Paper No. 280, 1995); John Bentley, "Egyptian Legal and
Judicial Sector Assessment" (1994: Report prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development).
52. Some transition economy competition laws allow private parties to enforce
antitrust prohibitions directly in the courts. See William E. Kovacic, Recommended
Action Plan for Implementing Georgia's Antimonopoly and Consumer Protection
Laws 10 (Center for Economic Policy and Reform, Analytical Report No. 9: May
1997) [hereinafter Recommended Action Plan] (describing private cause of action
under Georgia's antimonopoly law).
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agencies in transition economies sometimes find themselves
attempting to develop not only new substantive principles of
law, but also acting as test beds for procedural codes that promote honest public administration.53
7. Strong Political Opposition to Economic Reform
Transition countries typically contain powerful political
forces that wish to retard the development of a market system
and to impede the dismantling of government and business
institutions that centralized economic power in the state.'
Anti-reform constituencies can apply strong pressure on a new
antimonopoly agency to pursue an enforcement agenda that
reduces growth and otherwise inhibits economic liberalization.
Debilitating political opposition emerges from two major
sources. The chief anti-reform impulse flows from state-owned
enterprises and the government ministries that oversee their
operations.55 With prodding from organizations such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, transition
governments have adopted measures to diminish state ownership of business enterprises and establish a legal regime favoring private entrepreneurship. Despite such initiatives, relatively few transition governments have substantially reduced the
role of state-owned firms in their economies." Government
ministries and state-owned firms that derived economic and
political benefits from central planning have waged effective

53. See Roger A. Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antimonopoly Policy in
Ukraine, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INTL L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1997) (describing creation of a "codex" of administrative procedures for the Ukraine Antimonopoly Committee).
54. See Kovacic, Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms, supra note 4,
at 1203-05; Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur,supra note 48, at 439-41.

55. Vladimir Capelik and Ben Slay identify strong resistance by state-owned
enterprises and state ministries to market reforms in Russia and offer the following assessment of prospects for competition policy: "Further progress in Russian
competition policy may... require the creation of a different political context, in
which reformers will not be chronically overmatched against large state enterprises
that use market and political power to resist privatization, restructuring, and
market competition." Capelik & Slay, supra note 7, at 84.
56. One influential study by the World Bank offers the following assessment:
"Despite more than a decade of divestiture efforts and the growing consensus that
governments perform less well than the private sector in a host of activities, stateowned enterprises (SOEs) account for nearly as large a share of developing economies today as twenty years ago." WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE

ECONOMICS AND POLIcs OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 1 (1995).
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campaigns to resist implementation of market-oriented economic reforms. One should not underestimate their incentive
and ability to oppose liberalization measures, including efforts
by a new competition agency to enforce nominal prohibitions
against government discrimination against private entrepreneurs.
A second source of political opposition comes from domestic
producers who want the government to adopt protectionist
policies that tighten restrictions on imports. As trade barriers
are reduced, low-cost imports will capture sales from high-cost
domestic suppliers. In many transition economies, import competition generates demands from domestic producers that the
antimonopoly agency bring predatory pricing or anti-dumping
suits against importers.
8. Unrealistic Expectations About Competition Policy
The creation of transition economy competition systems
often coincides with the relaxation of central controls over
prices. The public and elected officials may perceive the
antimonopoly law as insurance against higher prices in the
post-decontrol period.5 7 Price increases that follow the
government's formal decontrol of prices can arouse social demands that the competition agency subject "monopolist" producers to price ceilings. Some transition economy antitrust
laws allow the competition agency to set prices for dominant
firms, 58 and the competition agency may encounter strong
pressure to use this authority widely to recreate the type of
pricing limits that prevailed during the era of planning. A
competition agency that lacks formal power to set price limits
for dominant firms nonetheless may face demands that it use
its enforcement authority to roll back prices."9

57. See Ana Julia Jatar, "Competition Policy in Latin-America: The Promotion
of a Social Change" 12 (Jan. 1995) (paper by the former head of Venezuela's competition agency discussing "exaggerated expectations by the political system and by
public opinion about what can be reasonably expected" in transition economy competition policy: noting that "inflation is usually confused with monopoly pricing
and pressures exist on the agency to punish companies for raising prices").
58. See Capelik & Slay, supra note 7, at 70-76 (explaining operation of
Russia's monopoly register); Boner, supra note 8, at 48-49 (describing transition
economy antitrust laws that allow the competition agency to control prices for
monopolists).
59. See Jatar, supra note 57, at 14 (in many transition economies, new coin-
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9. Institutional Novelty
Western advisors often propose that transition economies
create independent competition authorities that have no links
to existing government ministries. 0 The requisite independence most often is to be achieved by creating a new commission modeled along Western lines and possessing the power to
issue binding decisions subject to judicial review. In principle,
this structure promises to be the most effective enforcement
mechanism. Independence gives the new agency a single-minded focus on promoting competition. By divorcing the agency
from government bodies that oppose or are indifferent to reform, independence provides a sturdier platform for challenging government impediments to competition.
In practice, one should not underestimate the problems
associated with creating a new "independent" government
institution. This is particularly true where the new competition
agency assumes an institutional form, such as an independent
regulatory commission, that lacks a predecessor in the transition economy's structure of government. In no case can one
reasonably expect existing government bodies to cede power
willingly to the new competition authority. Consistent with
experience with public institution innovations in Western countries, a new institution is unlikely to be incorporated into the
transition economy government without friction. The inherent
fragility of a new institution should be taken into account in
deciding how ambitious an enforcement agenda the new agency should be asked to execute amid inevitable resistance from
other government bodies who regard the agency as a threat.
10. Weak Access to Antitrust-Relevant Business Data
In August 1996, during a conference in Lima on competition policy in Latin America, experts from Western competition
agencies showed a video produced by the European Union that
recreated a visit by EU antitrust officials to the premises of a

petition agencies "are under high political pressure to act against price increases,
something they are not empowered or designed to do").
60. See R. Shyam Khemani & Mark A. Dutz, The Instruments of Competition
Policy and Their Relevance for Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLCIES

AND REFORM, supra note 8, at 16, 28 (suggesting that "[tihe competition agency
should be independent and insulated from political and budgetary interference").
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corporation. In the video, the EU officials arrive at the firm's
office and present a document identifying records that the
antitrust officials wish to inspect. A business manager briefly
examines the document and soon leads the EU investigators to
a filing room. The investigators examine the records, make
copies of some items, offer a cordial farewell to the business
manager, and leave the offices. The video's dramatization was
designed to suggest the role that document requests play in
Western competition enforcement, and to provide a glimpse of
how such document requests are carried out.
For the Latin American competition agency officials in the
audience, or for antitrust agencies in most transition economies, the EU video presented an alien reality in which enforcement agency access to business records is routine and relatively frictionless. New competition agencies in transition economies seldom will enjoy ready access to business data needed to
prove that antitrust prohibitions have been violated. In some
instances, business managers in many transition economies
simply will refuse to respond to compulsory process requests,
or may assert falsely that the information demanded does not
exist. Many transition- countries lack smoothly functioning
judicial systems that expeditiously review and enforce compulsory process requests. It may take years of litigation for the
new competition agency to establish its right to obtain business records and to convince businesses that the country's
courts will sustain the use of compulsory process and punish
efforts to conceal or destroy records subject to a document
request. At least in the early years of a new competition
agency's operations, compulsory process is likely to be an unreliable tool for obtaining important business records.
Weak access to business data has important implications
for a competition agency's choice of enforcement initiatives.
Most competition laws in Western countries and transition
economies prohibit agreements among competitors to fix prices
or restrict output.6 ' To enforce a ban on collusion by competitors, an antitrust agency first must prove that the challenged
conduct results from collective action.6" In some transition
61. See Boner & Krueger, supra note 44, at 50-53 (describing the treatment of
horizontal restraints); Boner, supra note 8, at 42-43 (describing transition economy

horizontal restraints prohibitions).
62. See William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agree-
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countries, evidentiary standards may require the introduction
of a writing to establish the fact of concerted conduct.' Other
countries that allow competition agencies to introduce spoken
communications to prove the fact of concerted action may not
permit the expansive use of surveillance techniques, such as
wire tapping, that have become indispensable to the prosecution of covert collusive schemes in the United States." Difficulties in obtaining documentary records that reveal an agreement or in introducing evidence of a spoken exchange of assurances may impede the transition economy competition agency's
enforcement of prohibitions on horizontal restraints.
For some types of antitrust cases, gaining access to business records will not necessarily improve the competition
agency's ability to detect and prosecute violations of the competition law. Even when a firm complies voluntarily with a competition agency's information request, the firm's records may
shed little light on market conditions or the firm's competitive
position. In many state-owned firms or recently privatized
entities, internal accounting data and other business records
offer no economically meaningful perspective on the firm's
activities. Few enterprises, especially state-owned firms, maintain financial accounts that conform to internationally recognized standards or compile strategic plans, market analyses, or
competitor assessments of the type or quality that Western
competition agencies routinely use to decide whether to prosecute.
The recent successful challenge by the FTC to the merger
of Staples, Inc. and Office Depot, Inc.' illustrates the point.
The FTC's case and the district court's decision relied heavily
on internal company documents in which officials of Staples

ments Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 7 (1993) (describing the
importance to horizontal restraints enforcement of demonstrating that the conduct
at issue results from concerted action rather than unilateral behavior).
63. See Capelik & Slay, supra note 7, at 65-66 (explaining that Russian courts
have ruled that the country's competition agency can sustain a claim of illegal
collusion under the antimonopoly law only if the agency produces "written documents unambiguously proving the existence of an agreement").
64. See Judy Whalley, Prioritiesand Practices-TheAntitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 571 (1988) (describing Justice
Department's increased use of wiretapping and electronic surveillance to gather
evidence for price-fixing prosecutions).
65. Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc., Civ. No. 97-701 (TFH), 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9322 (D.D.C. June 30, 1997) (granting preliminary injunction).
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discounted the competitive influence of retailers such as WalMart, indicated that office "superstores" constituted a distinct
product market, and said that Staples enjoyed considerable
discretion to raise prices in geographic areas containing no
other office superstore." Without these "hot documents," the
FTC is unlikely to have attacked the transaction. The Commission also built its case on econometric estimates of the
merger's price effects. The raw material for the econometric
analysis consisted of data that the merging parties compiled on
a weekly basis for an 18-month period covering over 400 Staples stores located in more than 40 cities.6 7
In most transition economies, competition authorities in
the short and medium term seldom will be able to build cases
on internal business records that helped the FTC analyze the
Staples transaction. Many transition economy companies today
lack internal market assessments and strategic plans because
there was no need to prepare such materials in the era of planning. Many companies still use pre-reform accounting
systems
that do not accurately measure the firm's financial condition or
economic performance.
Where companies produce marketing studies or accounting
data pursuant to a discovery request, the competition agency
may find that the firm's assessment of industry conditions
distorts rather than clarifies the state of competition. During a
trip to Georgia in 1996, I participated in an interview with the
manager of a state-owned firm that distributes fertilizers. The
manager gave a glowing and, it seemed, sincere assessment of
his firm's capital stock, its research and development capability, and its sales force. He said no new entrant could overcome
the incumbent's advantages and survive in the same market.
Our own research suggested that his firm's physical capital
was decrepit and its human resources were not unique. With
modest investment, a new entrant could capture substantial
sales. An internal market study that committed the state-

66. See Staples, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9322, at *38; see also Hogan's Heroes,
CORPORATE CONTROL ALERT 5 (July/Aug. 1997) (describing the proceedings in the

Staples preliminary injunction case).
67. See Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 1997
ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L. REP. 6-7 (presentation before the Economics Committee of
the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Washington, D.C.) (describing FTC's use of
econometric analysis in developing and prosecuting the Staples case).

428

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XXIII:2

owned enterprise manager's buoyant assessment of his firm's
position to paper would offer Georgia's Antimonopoly Service a
misleading view of the industry.
In time, firms in transition economies will generate meaningful accounting data and will prepare informative analyses of
the market. The shift to a market system will introduce pressures (including competition from new entrants and monitoring
by investors) that compel firms to measure firm activity accurately and to monitor and evaluate market developments carefully. Improvements in firm-level accounting systems and market analysis will unfold over a period of years. Until that happens, new competition agencies cannot expect that even unfiltered access to a company's records will routinely provide useful material for evaluating business behavior egid developing
cases.
11. Uncertain Donor Support
Transition economies cannot count on foreign donors to
provide sustained assistance to support the implementation of
competition policy systems whose creation the same foreign
donors advocated. Foreign donors often display short attention
spans, and their commitment to supporting implementation of
new, market-oriented laws is unpredictable and intermittent.' A new antitrust agency cannot assume it will receive
substantial foreign assistance to build the institutional prerequisites for executing its law enforcement duties." This compels the competition agency to devise internal, self-sustaining
mechanisms to perform training and other activities needed to
create and preserve institutional capability.

68. See Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 48, at 446 (describing how the U.S. Agency for International Development's termination of technical assistance to Mongolia's antimonopoly program retarded implementation of
Mongolia's antimonopoly law).
69. Such assistance sometimes is forthcoming in the form of long-term, incountry programs by which donors place Western antimonopoly experts inside transition economy antimonopoly agencies. See Kovacic, Competition and Consumer
Protection Reforms, supra note 4, at 1218-20 (describing benefits of long-term, incountry technical assistance).
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B. Understandingthe Requirements of a Competition System
A review of initial conditions reveals the true magnitude of
the challenge confronting transition economies that desire to
create an effective competition policy system. Correctly understood, the establishment of a competition policy system in a
transition setting involves four major tasks, each of which may
require substantial changes in the country's economic, political,
and social environment. The transition economy must:
"

*
"
*

Create a new enforcement institution, equip it with
adequate physical and human capital, and develop an
agenda that promotes economic liberalization and can
withstand political opposition;
Establish new administrative procedures that control
the discretion of public officials;
Increase the business law acumen, administrative
efficiency, and honesty of the courts; and
Build collateral institutions, such as universities and
professional associations, that support the operation of
the competition policy system.

In short, the development of a competition policy system involves not only the formation of a new enforcement institution
(sometimes a public administration innovation such as an
independent commission) but also requires a transformation of
the country's courts, the establishment of a new body of administrative law, and the formation of other institutions of civil
society that determine the effectiveness of the rule of law.
III. DRAFTING AND IMPLEMENTING A MANAGEABLE LAW
The appropriate cure for the mismatch between ambitious
substantive commands and frail institutional capabilities is to
embrace a gradualist policy that rolls out a competition policy
system in phases." One way to do this is to begin with an

70. On the possibilities of implementing a competition policy program in phases, see Kovacic, Zimbabwe, supra note 50, at 258-65 (describing phased approach
for creating a competition program for Zimbabwe); ZIMBABWE MONOPOLIES COMIISSION, STUDY OF MONOPOLIES AND COMPETITION POLICY IN ZIMBABWE 95-104 (Sept.
1992) (presenting plan for phased implementation of a competition program in

Zimbabwe).
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austere law that emphasizes the establishment of implementing institutions, promotes competition advocacy, and imposes
few enforcement duties. The austere law can be augmented
over time with more expansive enforcement commands as the
requisite institutional capabilities are developed. Experience in
several transition economies suggests that it is unnecessary to
pack everything into the original competition statute, and that
later legislative enhancements are feasible."' A second approach is to include a comprehensive set of commands in the
original statute, but provide that the enforcement of such commands be introduced gradually over time to allow the institutional foundations for the competition policy system to be established first.
Whichever approach is taken, implementation concerns
warrant careful attention throughout the design of a new competition law. The drafting of a law should follow efforts to
study the major sources of market failure and to identify distinctive institutional conditions that affect the choice of strategies for correcting such failures. 2 At each step of the law
drafting process, the host country and its foreign advisors
should reveal and defend their assumptions about how the new
legal commands will be put into effect.
A. The First Phase of Implementation: Institution-Building
Whether adopted by a series of legislative measures or
specified in a single original enactment, a gradualist approach
would have two phases. The first phase would focus on five
tasks: establishing the competition policy agency, carrying out
an education and publicity program for the new competition
policy system, formulating a substantive research agenda,
71. See Boner & Kovacic, supra note 53 (discussing the gradual amendment
and legislative elaboration of Ukraine's antimonopoly law); Kovacic, Recommended
Action Plan, supra note 52, at 3-4 (reviewing Georgia's progression from a presidential decree on competition policy to legislative adoption of new competition and
consumer protection laws).
72. See Kovacic, Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms, supra note 4,
at 1202-14 (discussing importance of studying existing transition economy conditions as basis for drafting new laws); Spencer Weber Wailer & Rafael Muente,
Competition Law for Developing Countries: A Proposal for an Antitrust Regime in
Peru, 21 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 159, 165 (1989) (concluding that "a sophisticated political and economic analysis of the activities carried out by the enterprises
in a national economy is an important aid in designing competition legislation for
that country").
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initiating a competition advocacy program, and enhancing the
capability of collateral institutions that are important to implementing substantive legal commands.
1. Establishing the Competition Agency
The chief priority for the first phase of implementation is
to build the competition agency. Building the agency has several dimensions.
a.

Recruiting and Training the Professional Staff

The new agency must begin by acquiring the human capital to do its job well. The initial aim should be to hire a small
number of capable professionals with exposure to the law or
economics of competition law. The new agency need not begin
with a large complement of personnel. Transition economy
officials such as Beatriz Boza (Peru), Anna Fornalczyk (Poland), Ana Julia Jatar (Venezuela), Vazha Maisuradze (Georgia), and Alexander Zavada (Ukraine) have shown that it is
possible to build a new competition agency around a small
number of carefully chosen professionals and use the core team
3
to oversee the expansion and training of the agency's staff."
An important and sometimes overlooked need is to hire a
small number of attorneys with litigation experience and a
sound knowledge of administrative law and civil procedure.
Particularly in its early years, a competition agency will be
required to convince the courts that its cases are procedurally
sound and substantively meritorious. Soon after it is established, the agency may be forced to litigate cases involving
crucial enforcement issues such as the validity of its interpretation of substantive antitrust commands, the scope of its power to compel the production of business records, and the
bounds of its remedial authority. Because the outcome of the
first litigated cases can have lasting effects on the agency's
reputation and effectiveness, it is vital that the agency be
ready to address and prevail on these issues from the very
start.
Failure to attend to technical legal details could prove

73. See Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 48, at 452-60,

432

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. MXII:2

costly in jurisdictions, such as many civil law countries, where
courts are likely to focus on irregularities in process. Some
transition economy courts have extensive knowledge about
administrative procedure, but few have any familiarity with
market economics or an understanding of the principles underlying the operation of an antitrust system.74 Because they are
attuned to matters of process, judges reviewing antitrust matters for the first time tend to focus chiefly on an enforcement
agency's adherence to procedural formalities and to ignore the
merits of a case.75 In anticipating the possibility of litigation,
the new competition agency would be wise to ensure that its
first initiatives comply perfectly with procedural requirements
and administrative formalities. Early, extensive involvement
by lawyers specializing in administrative law and civil procedure is necessary to achieve this end.
The agency will need to begin immediately to increase the
intellectual capital of top management and to train new employees in the concepts and practical techniques of competition
law. In substance, the agency needs to undertake two types of
training. The first consists of a basic introduction to the icroeconomic principles and legal concepts underlying the operation of a competition policy system. The second takes the form
of workshops in which the agency's professionals participate in
role-playing, problem-solving exercises based on competition
problems that commonly arise in the host country or transition

74. See TINEO, supra note 2, at 35:
The courts [in Latin America] are not prepared to administer laws of this

kind. Judges are highly trained in, and take very seriously, their role of
guarding against legal defects in the actions of administrative agencies,
i.e., they are well-placed to exert control over powers of intervention, but

not to rule on the substantive aspects of competition law. In light of the
history of State abuse, the courts have given preeminence to the formal

over the substantive, as a means of disciplining the State and protecting
individual rights and constitutional- safeguards.
75. In discussing Latin America's competition policy systems, Luis Tineo emphasizes this point as follows:
Given the history of official arbitrariness and disregard for due process,
the acts of the competition agencies are highly vulnerable to the application of strict legal standards. Just as the courts tend to give precedence
to form over substance, so the agencies are for their part very apt to
favor substance over form, with the result that efforts to ensure the
proper functioning of markets are often frustrated by failure to understand the circumstances in which the law is to be enforced.
Id. at 32.
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economies generally.
One means for training is for the new agency to take advantage of instruction provided by bodies such as the OECD
and UNCTAD. In discussions with transition economy antitrust officials, I have found that the greatest need for training
is for detailed instruction in the practical techniques-the
know-how of antitrust analysis-for conducting investigations,
applying a conceptual framework to the facts of an industry,
and designing remedies. Managers in new antimonopoly agencies want foreign experts to describe how commonly-accepted
analytical methodologies can best be applied to the typical
transition economy setting of fragmented, unreliable, and often
inaccessible business data, poorly developed investigation and
discovery techniques, and limited expertise in antitrust law
and industrial organization economics. Especially in
antimonopoly offices created in the early 1990s, many professional staff members have at least a basic understanding of
essential antitrust ideas such as the conceptual framework for
delineating relevant markets and measuring market power.
Such officials need hands-on exercises and practical protocols
for putting these concepts to work in their own countries.
Foreign training programs must be supplemented with
internal training exercises that draw on foreign experience and
problems based upon the country's own economy. Regular internal training exercises are necessary elements of a larger
effort to create self-sustaining mechanisms for enhancing analytical capability and transmitting the agency's accumulated
know-how to new personnel. The likelihood of rapid turnover
in the junior professional staff places a premium on the
agency's ability to train newly-hired economists and lawyers.
The optimal mix of training should consist of participation in:
"
"

*

Training exercises organized and presented by foreign
donors and competition policy organizations;
Occasional conferences and seminars held in-country
and conducted by a mix of senior antimonopoly agency
officials and foreign advisors, including experts from
other transition economies; and
Regular internal training exercises conducted by agency personnel in its headquarters and regional offices.

The latter form of training should develop standardized exer-
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cises the agency can revise and use repeatedly over time.
b.

Obtaining Adequate Office Resources

To function effectively, a new agency requires phone, fax,
copier, and computer capability, along with an information
network that links its offices. Initial priority should be given to
obtaining, from the national budget and foreign donors, information systems hardware and software. Internet access is a
valuable tool for transition economy agencies to collect data on
business developments and enforcement activity in other nations, and to inform external constituencies about their work.
Foreign donors that are keen on having transition economies
create new competition policy systems should incorporate
funds for equipment into their technical assistance budgets
from the beginning.
Sensible programs to support the acquisition of office
equipment will occur only if donors collectively exercise better
judgment than they have in the past about technical assistance
priorities. Donors too often waste resources by providing assistance-for example, preparing comparative studies or conducting certain types of training exercises-that other donors already have supplied adequately.76 A competition agency can
buy a substantial amount of office equipment for the cost of
bringing two foreign experts to town for a week of superficial
seminars or fact-gathering that simply repeats the work of
earlier teams of foreign advisors.
c.

Organizing the Agency

The new agency must promptly create the organizational
framework that will govern the allocation of responsibilities
and control its flow of work. Important organizational priorities include:
Creating operational bureaus with clearly defined
responsibilities;

76. See Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur,supra note 48, at 448-50 (describing needless duplication of donor technical assistance to transition economy
competition authorities).
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Developing central administrative units, including an
office that oversees the training of new employees and
a secretariat that collects and maintains the agency's
records.
Establishing a public affairs office to educate external
constituencies about the new competition law and the
agency's activities.

Priority should be given to functions for which an institutional
failure inight be most damaging to the agency. For example,
before the agency begins collecting business records, it must
institute safeguards to ensure that such records can be retrieved readily and that confidential information will not be
disclosed. A lapse in such safeguards early in the agency's
existence could raise fatal doubts about its competence.
d.

Designing Internal Procedures

Related to constructing the agency's architecture is the
creation of procedures that describe how the agency will function internally and will deal with external bodies. A crucial
priority for creating internal procedures is to define, for professional staff, the process the agency will follow to approve investigations and cases. Important aspects of the agency's external procedures include statements of the responsibilities of
each office of the agency and explanations of how citizens or
economic agents can file complaints with the agency or otherwise make formal requests of the agency.
An additional dimension of process-oriented institution
building is to establish agency policies that ensure that agency
employees execute their responsibilities honorably and that the
agency is perceived externally as a firm but fair champion of
the nation's competition laws. The agency can serve as an
important prototype for testing restrictions on conflicts of interest and other requirements that diminish opportunities for
corruption and build a reputation for administrative integrity.
Efforts to curb conflicts of interest and corruption-for example, by limiting outside employment-are closely related to
salaries. It is better for the agency to retain a small number of
capable, well paid employees than to hire a large number of
staff members who will feel compelled to hold a second job.
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Designing Guidelines and Protocols

Transition economy competition laws vary in their specificity, but most statutes contain general substantive commands
and give the competition agency extensive discretion to determine whether business practices fall within the statutes' prohibitions. The laws articulate basic principles and rely on administrative rules to supply operational content. Two forms of
administrative clarification will be necessary to execute individual statutory provisions in a manner that provides suitable
guidance to affected parties, redresses truly harmful behavior,
and does not deter desirable business conduct.
The first level of elaboration consists of presenting a conceptual framework that defines how the substantive command
will be applied in practice. The competition agency in many
Western countries publishes this conceptual framework as a
guideline to inform the business community and its own professional staff about how the agency will exercise its discretion.77 Transition economies should follow a similar practice.78 The effort to prepare such guidelines forces the
antimonopoly agency to understand and resolve issues associated with defining a relevant market or enforcing a ban
against predatory pricing. For agencies with a mix of competition and consumer protection duties, the development of guidelines can assist the agency in attaining consistency between its
competition and consumer protection policies-for example, by
avoiding overly restrictive limits on advertising that raise the
costs of entry and entrench the position of incumbent suppli79
ers.
The second step is to translate the conceptual framework
into operational criteria by which the competition authority's

77. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992) (policy statement describing the federal government's methodology for evaluating horizontal mergers), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
13,104.
78. See William E. Kovacic & Ben Slay, Recommended Guidelines for Implementing Georgia's Antimonopoly and Consumer Protection Laws (Center for Economic Policy and Reform, Analytical Report No. 8: Apr. 2, 1997) (presenting proposed enforcement guidelines for Georgia's Antimonopoly Service).
79. For a recent attempt to provide a conceptual framework that would enable
competition agencies to harmonize their antitrust and consumer protection activities, see Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified
Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997).
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staff can apply the framework in practice. Prepared in the
form of internal agency protocols, the operational criteria
would consist of methodologies, check-lists, and other highly
practical guides for the staff to use in gathering and interpreting information about specific practices. For example, the agency could prepare an investigation protocol that an attorney or
economist might use to determine the dimensions of the relevant market in a merger or monopolization case. The protocol
would suggest questions that the staff might pose in an interview with industry participants, or identify data sources that
the staff should consult.
f.

Creating an Institutional Memory

Competition agencies must cope with substantial turnover
within the top management tier and the professional staff. In a
number of new agencies, the first generation of leaders and
professional staff members have moved on to private sector
jobs in which they appear before the competition authority or
the courts on behalf of business clients. Because personnel can
change frequently, it is important to develop mechanisms to
ensure that valuable institutional know-how does not leave the
agency with every retirement or move to a new job. Early in its
existence, the agency should create manuals containing relevant laws, regulations, organizational data, policy statements,
and operational protocols. The manuals should be updated
regularly and made available to all new employees.
g.

Building Relationships with Foreign Competition
Authorities and Donors

A new agency can increase its effectiveness by drawing on
the experiences and resources of foreign competition policy
bodies. Multinational bodies such as the OECD and UNCTAD
subsidize training activities and provide useful data on competition policy trends in transition economies. Individual Western
competition bodies frequently supply short-term technical assistance to transition economy competition agencies, and some
Western groups have funded long-term projects that place
in the offices of their transition economy counWestern8experts
0
terparts.
80. See Kathleen E. McDermott, U.S. Officials Provide Competition Counseling
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New competition agencies should develop relationships
with a wide array of Western antitrust bodies and donors. For
two reasons, diversification helps increase the new
antimonopoly agency's access to foreign assistance. First, because the ability of any single foreign entity to provide assistance may change over time, maintaining numerous relationships increases the prospects of receiving foreign technical
assistance. Second, individual national bodies sometimes compete to gain influence in shaping foreign laws.8 ' Sustaining
ties with several national groups can stimulate rivalry that increases the resources available to the transition economy agency.
Foreign competition authorities from transition economies
can be an especially valuable resource. Far more than their
Western counterparts, current and former transition economy
antitrust officials can provide insights about solving the distinctive problems associated with establishing new competition
institutions and developing enforcement programs in the transition environment. Participation in regional working groups or
associations also can provide venues for transition economy
agencies to share information on enforcement trends and to lay
a foundation for cooperating in enforcement activities that
address transnational competition problems.
2. Establishing an Education and Publicity Program
A central contribution of new competition agencies is to
educate consumers, business leaders, and government officials
about the competition policy system and help them understand
the rationale for relying on market rivalry as the organizing
principle for economic activity.82 Among other measures, the
new agency should develop ties with media organizations to
inform the public about the content and enforcement of the
country's competition and consumer protection laws." As notto Eastern Europe, 6 ANTITRUST 4, 4-7 (1991) (describing placement of teams of

Justice Department and FTC antitrust economists and lawyers in antimonopoly
agencies in Eastern Europe).
81. See Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur,supra note 48, at 448-51 (describing donor rivalry to influence design of transition economy competition systems).

82. See Jatar, supra note 57, at 13 (observing that "[cihanges in conduct and
attitudes must be considered one of the major goals in competition policy" in transition economies).
83. Compare Capelik & Slay, supra note 7, at 80 ("Despite the fact that it is
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ed below, an education and publicity program can help establish the antimonopoly agency as the government's preeminent
advocate for pro-competitive liberalization measures."
3. Formulating a Research Agenda
The new agency should begin performing research on obstacles to market rivalry. Case studies can serve valuable substantive and methodological objectives. Performing studies can
enrich the agency's understanding of market phenomena that
it must analyze and address in applying its enforcement powers. Case studies also serve important methodological ends. A
study can be seen as an opportunity for the agency's staff to
develop skills that are instrumental in investigating possible
violations of the law and building cases.
Case studies deserve donor support and should be viewed
as important ingredients of technical assistance. Collaboration
between the agency and foreign advisors can be effective elements of the agency's training program. In performing case
studies, the agency's professional staff can acquire familiarity
with the analytical tools and information-gathering methodologies that will be needed to enforce the competition law.'
4. Developing a Competition Advocacy Program
The education, publicity, and research activities provide
the basis for the agency to serve as an advocate for competition
throughout the government. Part of the early institution building effort is to identify (through research) the major impediments to market rivalry, including government policies that
suppress competition. Well before it begins bringing cases, the

one of the most important institutions for promoting
antimonopoly agency] has not worked effectively with the
information on competition policy is not provided to either
outside experts in an open, transparent manner").
84. Compare Slay, supra note 9, at 143 ("Perhaps the

competition, [Russia's
mass media. Indeed,
the general public or
[Polish] Antimonopoly

Office's most important (and least-discussed) function has been the advocacy of
liberal, pro-competitive solutions to economic policy problems during the Polish
transition).
85. See Kovacic & Thorpe, supra note 46, at 89 (describing the usefulness of
case studies as means for foreign experts to transmit analytical know-how and
information-gathering techniques to transition economy economists and lawyers);
Kovacic, Competition Policy Entrepreneur, supra note 48, at 471 (same).
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competition agency can use its education, publicity, and research activities to criticize government restrictions on entry
and market access. Particularly for a new agency facing severe
resource constraints, advocacy provides a way to promote the
adoption of pro-competitive policies without the extensive commitment of personnel that the prosecution of cases often entails.
5. Building and Enhancing Collateral Institutions
The last ingredient of the initial implementation phase is
to establish and enhance collateral institutions whose effectiveness will facilitate the success of the new competition policy
agency. The most important institution-building priority outside the enforcement agency is to train judges in the principles
of market economics and competition law. In most transition
countries, the courts will play a major role in interpreting the
law's requirements and reviewing agency decisions. In some
systems, the antimonopoly law allows a private cause of action
as a safeguard against government agency corruption or sloth.
With rare exceptions, transition economy judges lack even the
most basic substantive expertise to perform this task. Unless
such judges are trained early in the implementation process,
there is a grave risk that they will issue perverse interpretations of the law.
A second priority is to educate and work with nongovernment organizations such as consumer groups, bar associations,
and trade associations. With assistance from donors, the
antimonopoly agency can give speeches and organize seminars
for these groups. The agency also should develop liaison arrangements to encourage nongovernment groups to inform
their constituencies about the competition law and the agency's
enforcement programs.8 6 Cooperation with outside organizations can also help stimulate critical discussion and debate
that ultimately promotes the development of sound competition
policies.
A third activity is for the antimonopoly agency to create
relations with university departments in economics, business,

86. See Capelik & Slay, supra note 7, at 80 (urging Russia's antitrust agency
to "work more closely with mass media and consumer protection organizations in
the enforcement of antimonopoly law").
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law, and public administration. The goal is to encourage these
departments to develop competition policy courses and to interest faculty members in writing about competition issues. Over
time the university community will provide employees for the
agency and generate useful research about competition policy.
B. The Second Phaseof Implementation: Developing a Positive
Enforcement Agenda
The second phase of implementation would consist of expanding the competition agency's law enforcement responsibilities to supplement advocacy, publicity, and research initiatives.
Enforcement and advocacy efforts in the second phase would
have three major focal points.
1. Promoting New Business Entry
The first priority of transition economy antimonopoly enforcement should be to remove artificial obstacles to entry by
new entrepreneurs, particularly where such obstacles are imposed by government bodies. Major elements of a pro-entry
program would include advocacy and enforcement initiatives to
prevent government ministries from imposing unjustified curbs
on entry and giving discriminatory advantages to incumbent
state-owned enterprises. An attractive feature of many transition economy competition laws is that their prohibitions apply
to behavior by government ministries and state-owned firms
and can serve to challenge a wide range of entry-limiting behavior by public instrumentalities.87
A "government first" program to eliminate public policies
that suppress rivalry has several advantages. First, government intervention is the greatest source of trade restraints in
transition environments, and challenges to public entry barriers promise to yield the greatest benefits in increasing competition and improving consumer well-being.88
Second, opposition to government interference with market
processes can help the competition agency gain private sector

87. See Kovacic, Recommended Action Plan, supra note 52, at 7 (discussing
Article 10 of Georgia's antimonopoly law, which forbids various forms of government conduct that diminishes competition).
88. See Kovacic & Thorpe, supra note 46, at 93 (describing competition-suppressing state policies in Mongolia).
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support and establish the agency's credibility when it seeks the
cooperation of the business community in obtaining voluntary
compliance with provisions of the antimonopoly law.
Third, enforcement directed at government restraints on
competition typically will pose the least difficult problems of
proof for the new agency. Suspect forms of government intervention usually will involve well-documented overt acts-such
as issuing a contract that includes an exclusive license-whose
existence and purpose are relatively easy to establish without
extensive discovery. Compared to challenging a subtle, covert
price-fixing arrangement, which requires broad access to company records and the cooperation of witnesses, attacking government barriers to competition will impose fewer informational demands on the agency.
Fourth, the agency's efforts to dismantle government barriers to competition are likely to coincide most closely with what
foreign donors believe to be the best form of competition policy
in transition economies. Such initiatives are most likely to
elicit donor support for activities (such as investments in training and equipment) needed to increase the agency's effectiveness.
Fifth, challenges to government impediments to competition can facilitate efforts to reduce corruption in public administration. Ministry decisions involving matters such as licenses,
permits, and subsidies sometimes result from corrupt agreements between public officials and business managers. Transition economy antitrust provisions that deny government agencies discretion to grant or withhold certain rights and privileges in effect allow antimonopoly agencies to deny enforcement of corrupt arrangements. By preventing government
ministries from delivering on their promises to exclude competitors in return for bribes, the application of the
antimonopoly law may help discourage the formation of such
agreements in the first place.
Challenging public restraints on rivalry is not costless or
risk-free.89 The greatest potential disadvantage is that a program aimed at government-imposed trade restraints will align
the competition agency against formidable political opponents,
notably alliances between state-owned enterprises and their

89. I am grateful to Michael Trebilcock for this point.
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patrons within the government. An enforcement agenda that
repeatedly pits a new and fragile institution against powerful
foes may elicit a crushing political backlash. David might defeat Goliath in a single, winner-take-all contest, but Goliath's
odds of vanquishing his diminutive opponent improve steadily
as the number of encounters increases.
2. Preserving the Benefits of Privatization
Privatization programs raise a number of competition
policy concerns. For some sectors subject to state ownership, it
may be possible to structure privatization plans to establish
viable competing firms rather than simply sustaining organizational structures that vested all productive activity in one
enterprise. The competition policy agency can play a useful
role by advocating consideration and implementation of privatization solutions that tend to maximize opportunities for competition in the post-privatization period.'
Where privatization yields competing entities in a given
sector, the newly-established private firms may seek through
mergers or the formation of holding companies to recreate the
unified organizational structure that prevailed during the era
of state ownership. Some consolidation will enhance efficiency,
as firms seek to eliminate redundant capacity and realize economies of scale and scope. Nonetheless, competition agency scrutiny of mergers will be appropriate to ensure that proposed
consolidations do not reestablish monopolies, such as holding
companies that control all producers in the relevant market.
The possibilities for mergers to create or reinforce market
power will be greatest in service sectors in which imports, even
in a liberalized trade regime, do not supply an effective competitive constraint.
3. Opening Strategic Bottlenecks to Competition
In choosing enforcement targets, the agency should focus
on economic activities where increased competition in one
sector generates large economic benefits by expanding output

90. See Capelik & Slay, supra note 7, at 61 (describing role of Russia's State
Committee on Antimonopoly Policy in promoting disaggregation of Russia's construction industry as part of the privatization process).
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in other sectors that consume inputs of the first sector. Major
examples would include transportation, financial services,
energy, and communications. Increased competition in these
areas would improve the functioning of networks that deeply
influence the rate of economic growth.
Transportation provides an illustration. Cartels involving
trucking companies, airport service firms, and port facilities
are common in transition economies. By lowering the costs of
moving goods into, out of, and across the country, increased
competition among transportation firms can reduce the delivered prices of many goods, make previously insulated geographic markets contestable by distant sources of supply, and
reduce the cost of exporting. An effort to challenge cartels
among transportation firms could generate substantial gains
for the transition country economy.
4. Synthesis: An Early Enforcement Agenda
An enforcement agenda designed to cope with the institutional weaknesses that beset most new antimonopoly agencies
might have the following ingredients. One element would be
challenges to overt agreements that impede competition and
lack offsetting benefits. One such set of enforcement targets
consists of formal grants of exclusive licenses by government
ministries to incumbent business operators. The fact of the
exclusive license would be easy to establish, because both the
grantor and the holder of the exclusive right ordinarily invoke
the license to deny permission for new firms to enter. In one of
its early cases, Georgia's small and thinly-funded antimonopoly
agency succeeded in voiding a decision by the Cabinet of Ministers to make one firm the exclusive supplier of insurance to
traders who must buy insurance to carrying out certain import
activities. The decision preserved opportunities for other insurance companies to compete in a market that influenced the
cost of conducting trade in Georgia.
A second type of suspect overt agreement consists of trade
association practices that are remnants of the central planning
era. To carry out national planning aims, trade association bylaws sometimes contain provisions that restrict new entry,
allocate business opportunities, or otherwise curtail rivalry
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among industry participants."' Even where the government
abandons its support for such measures as part of economic
liberalization, private enforcement of competition-suppressing
by-laws may persist. Such agreements are easily proven and
clearly violate most transition economy prohibitions on horizontal restraints.
A second category of cases would consist of efforts by government ministries to consolidate recently privatized, independent firms into industry-wide holding companies subject to
ministerial oversight. Particularly in nontradeable service
sectors, such industry-wide amalgamations seldom have compelling efficiency rationales and often have strong potential to
create durable monopoly power and deprive the country of the
benefits of a privatization program. In a number of cases,
Georgia's antimonopoly agency has successfully opposed efforts
by government agencies to cartelize specific industry sectors by
merging all industry participants into single holding companies
or forcing such participants to operate under the supervision of
quasi-government trade associations.
A third focal point of early enforcement would consist of
opposing efforts by government ministries, often acting at the
behest of incumbent state-owned enterprises, to withhold approvals for new entrants or discriminate in favor of incumbent
suppliers. Government denials of licenses and permits can be
powerful barriers to new competition. National, regional, or
local officials sometimes withhold necessary approvals from
private entrepreneurs because the market in question "contains too many firms" or suffers from "excess capacity." In
other cases, government bodies direct one state-owned firm to
channel needed inputs to another state-owned firm and to
terminate or interrupt supply contracts with a private firm
that consumes those inputs.
Here again the experience of the Georgian antimonopoly
agency provides an illustration of what a nascent enforcement
body can accomplish. Georgia's agency successfully opposed
efforts by government officials in Tbilisi to restrict a small
bakery to making sales in selected areas of the city. The local

91. See Kovacic, Zimbabwe, supra note 50, at 260 & n.24 (describing competition-suppressing provisions of by-laws of Zimbabwean construction industry trade
association).
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officials had sought to delineate an exclusive sales territory for
an incumbent state-owned bakery that was losing business to
many new bakeries that had sprung up in the course of liberalization and were offering more attractive product lines. The
antinonopoly agency's intervention permitted the bakery to
compete for sales in other areas of the city. Beyond its unambiguous efficiency virtues, this type of case has a clear appeal
to consumers and helps the antimonopoly agency position itself
as a champion for the country's emerging private sector.
IV. MAKING AN UNMANAGEABLE LAW WORKABLE

Transition economy competition statutes rarely are designed to establish new institutions and implement legal commands in phases. Instead, such laws usually establish farreaching substantive prohibitions and create new bodies that
must be built from the ground up at the same time that the
new agencies are expected to carry out their enforcement obligations. Georgia's competition policy system again provides an
example.
Georgia has some of the newest transition economy competition laws. In 1996 Georgia adopted a Law on Monopolistic
Activities and Competition and a Consumer Rights Protection
Law and created an Antimonopoly Service, which began operations in January 1997.92 The 1996 statutes gave the
Antimonopoly Service responsibility for enforcing three distinct
legal regimes:
*
"

•

Traditional antitrust controls on horizontal restraints,
vertical restraints, dominant firm behavior, and mergers;
Prohibitions on unfair business practices such as misleading advertising, misappropriation of intellectual
property, disparagement of competitors, and fraudulent nondisclosure of information in sales transactions;
and
Consumer protection prohibitions on various seller
failures to fulfill mandatory product quality, information disclosure, and delivery terms.

92. See Kovacic, Recommended Action Plan, supra note 52, at 1-5 (discussing
origin and content of Georgia's antitrust and consumer protection laws).
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To implement any one of these legal regimes successfully
would be a substantial undertaking for a new government
institution. To implement all three simultaneously is an enormous challenge, even where the public enforcement body is
well-funded and the nation's courts are experienced in the
resolution of commercial disputes. Georgia's Antimonopoly
Service faces acute resource constraints, and the Georgian
courts have little knowledge of concepts essential to resolving
disputes involving competition and consumer protection issues.
It is hard to overstate the magnitude of the task that the 1996
laws assign to the Antimonopoly Service and Georgian judges.
Where the legal framework, like Georgia's, does not expressly mandate phased implementation, the new competition
agency must, in effect, create and execute a phased implementation strategy if it is to survive and flourish. The agency must
give priority to institution-building while carrying out a minimalist enforcement program that does not outrun the agency's
institutional capability. At the same time, the agency must
demonstrate its commitment to execute its legal obligations
and thereby establish a credible presence as an enforcement
institution.
The discussion below suggests how a competition authority
and supporting donor organizations can establish a sound
institutional infrastructure and begin to enforce the law. In its
first year of operation, a new competition agency should seek
to accomplish three basic goals. The first priority is to build
the institutional capability of the competition agency and other
institutions (such as the courts) whose activities will influence
the implementation of the country's competition law. The second aim is for the agency to educate business managers, government bodies, nongovernment organizations such as bar
associations, universities, and consumers about the aims and
requirements of the new law, and to publicize the agency's
efforts to carry out its duties. The third goal is for the agency
to design and apply a substantive enforcement program that
establishes the credibility of its enforcement powers, accounts
for existing institutional constraints, and deflects political
demands for counterproductive enforcement approaches.
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A. Building the Competition Agency and Related Institutions
The chief priority for a new competition agency in its first
year should be to build the institutional foundation for carrying out substantive enforcement programs. This means conducting the institution-building activities discussed in Part III
above. 3 The new competition agency may feel pressure to invest minimal effort in institution-building and to emphasize
the prosecution of cases that it can hold out to external constituencies as evidence that it is a vital, functioning body. The
ageicy may experience a great tension between satisfying
external demands for "action" and accomplishing more mundane but vital administrative and organizational tasks that are
necessary to get the new institution on its feet. Institutionbuilding does not have the same apparent pay-off as the prosecution of a highly visible case, but it is fundamental to the
ability of the agency over the medium-term and long-term to
use its enforcement authority effectively. Attending to organizational and administrative details in the first year will pay
handsome benefits in the future.
B. A Suggested Programof Education and Publicity
The second goal for the first year is to educate external
constituencies about the competition law and to publicize the
agency's work. Education and publicity will help acquaint
various constituencies with competition law principles and
with the agency's functions and operations. The education and
publicity program can help establish a perception of the agency
as the nation's champion for competition policy and market
processes.
Education and publicity program should have several
elements. One is to publish booklets and brochures that describe the agency's activities and explain its powers. 4 These
should address all of the agency's external constituencies. A
second element is to appear in mass media fora. A third is to

93. See discussion supra Part llI.A.1.a.
94. This should include the preparation of an annual report that surveys the
agency's activities. A number of transition economy competition agencies publish
exceptionally informative annual reports or other regular compendia of official

decisions and policy statements. These include Chile, Mexico, Peru, Poland,
Ukraine, and Venezuela.
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cooperate with business groups, consumer organizations, and
other nongovernment bodies to explain the agency's work. A
fourth element is to regularly inform legislators and other
government officials about the agency's work.
C. A Suggested Programfor Competition Enforcement
The combination of expansive responsibilities and austere
funding compels transition economy competition authorities to
make the best possible use of the limited resources at their
disposal. By necessity, new competition agencies must be highly selective in their choice and phasing of enforcement activities. New agencies must develop an analytical framework for
identifying serious market failures and pursuing remedial
strategies that achieve the maximum consumer benefit with
the smallest possible outlay of resources. Creating such a
framework and devising operational criteria to apply the
framework should be central priorities in the first year.
Another element of selectivity is the need to develop a
strategy that allows the competition agency to anticipate and
dissipate political pressure to pursue matters (e.g.,
antidumping cases) that would diminish business rivalry.
Antimonopoly agencies throughout the world routinely are
given legal mandates whose exercise can arouse powerful political opposition. To be effective and survive, antimonopoly enforcement officials must carefully build political capital and
spend it wisely.
A new competition agency can expect to be criticized for
doing too much and too little. Some enforcement efforts (particularly those attacking government efforts to suppress competition) will endanger incumbent enterprises and their ministerial
patrons. Beneficiaries of the status quo may use their economic
and political power to seek to prevent the agency from pursuing matters that promote the national interest. On other occasions, by refusing to challenge certain behavior (such as competition from imports that offers consumers superior products
at lower prices and reduces the sales of domestic producers),
the agency may attract demands to bring cases that would
retard growth or diminish consumer well-being. No agency
operates in a political vacuum, and each must choose cases
with an eye toward developing political support that will help
it pursue initiatives that strengthen the market process, and to
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resist political demands that it take action that would reduce
competition and restrict consumer choice.
To cope with political realities, the transition economy
competition agency should copy the practice of its Western
counterparts and build an enforcement portfolio that diversifies against political risk. The portfolio should contain three
types of matters. The first and largest part of the portfolio
should consist of initiatives that can be depicted as constituting "mainstream" enforcement because they increase economic
welfare and seem clearly consistent with international competition policy standards and promote attainment of national
economic liberalization goals. In its publicity and education
activities, the agency should strive to define its work as falling
within this mainstream.
The second ingredient is a small number of cases that are
politically popular (and perhaps inevitable), such as antidumping matters, and have adverse welfare effects. With some
effort, the agency may be able to identify cases of this type
that will satisfy insistent political constituencies but also have
neutral or only mildly negative welfare effects.
The last element is a small number of cases that promise
large welfare improvements and pose great political risks. The
agency can bring a few of these cases but must pick its spots
carefully. Operating in this region of the enforcement spectrum
too often could endanger the new institution, especially in its
first years.
A new competition agency has a number of tools at its
disposal for obtaining compliance with the law. The term "enforcement" sometimes connotes the prosecution of cases in the
courts. A properly conceived enforcement program uses a variety of devices to correct existing violations, encourage future
compliance, and otherwise accomplish the objectives of the
competition statute. The portfolio of agency enforcement efforts
in the early phase of operations should include three distinct
types of activities.
1. Studies and Competition Advocacy
Most transition economy competition laws authorize the
agency to perform competition advocacy functions.95 Perform95. See, e.g., TINEO, supra note 2, at 24-25 (observing that the laws of Brazil,
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ing studies of important legal and economic impediments to
competition can be a valuable means for fulfilling this role.
Performing studies can help the agency to accomplish several
institutional and substantive goals. In terms of institutionbuilding, the process of conducting a study-reading the relevant literature, gathering and analyzing data, and interviewing informed observers-can help the agency's staff learn the
concepts of competition policy, gain experience in applying
concepts to the facts of specific industries, and acquire an understanding of specific business sectors and public policies. In
terms of substance, publishing carefully prepared studies can
be a valuable way to draw attention to and stimulate the correction of market failures and to establish the agency's reputation as an authority on competition policy.
2. Voluntary Compliance
For the first year of operations, the agency should encourage business enterprises and government entities to voluntarily abandon practices that violate the law. In education and
publicity activities, the agency should indicate its awareness
that the new law represents a new direction for economic policy, and that a necessary step in applying the new legislation is
to inform business and government officials about the law's
requirements and give them an opportunity to change behavior
that contradicts the laws. One benefit of an education campaign is to dispel the notion that the agency abruptly and
"unfairly" punished firms for conduct that the government
encouraged or mandated in the pre-reform period.96 The agency may be able to reach agreements with government bodies or
businesses to discontinue illegal acts and adopt procedures for

Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and Peru authorize competition agencies to
issue non-binding opinions to other government bodies challenging anticompetitive
regulations or proposed regulations).
96. Pre-reform government policy in communist and socialist countries either
compelled or urged producers to form agreements on prices or other terms of
trade. See Jatar, supra note 57, at 13:
Since firms do not feel they are doing anything wrong when they negotiate prices or market share, the enforcement of pro-competition legislation
requires important promotion and educational efforts in order to make
punitive actions understood and accepted. In fact, the first firms to be
prosecuted feel persecuted by the pro-competition agency. Managers feel
that "after all, they are acting like everybody else does."
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ensuring future compliance with the law.
3. Compulsory Enforcement
The first year of operations should feature limited use of
compulsory enforcement techniques to stop clear violations of
the law and to show the agency's willingness to use compulsion
where voluntary compliance is not forthcoming or effective.
The agency need not bring large numbers of cases to demonstrate its seriousness. A reasonable goal for the first year is to
bring one case involving a clearly illegal episode of behavior
that affects a widely purchased consumer good or service. The
goal is to select a case that plainly harms competition, is readily understandable by the public and business community, and
is certain to withstand review in the courts. The agency should
widely publicize and explain the case to increase understanding about the competition system and build a reputation for
openness. 7
CONCLUSION
Implementation is the achilles heel of competition law
reform in transition economies. Foreign donors and transition
economy governments tend to slight implementation concerns
in preparing new antitrust legislation. Successful implementation requires not only the careful design of substantive prohibitions and the construction of an effective competition enforcement body, but also entails improvements in other institutions
such as courts, professional associations, and universities that
influence the direction and impact of competition policy. The
institutional ingredients that make ambitious competition
systems feasible in Western economies rarely exist now in
transition settings and will take decades to build.
This Article proposes that new competition policy programs be introduced in phases that correspond to the development of institutional foundations on which robust, substantial
97. See id. at 14:
Itihe actions initiated by the competition agency require an important
communicational effort: opinions and decisions must be given to the public with a clear analysis of the relevant issues. If these efforts are not
taken seriously and the emphasis is placed on punitive actions, the competition agency runs the risk of mistakenly positioning itself as an inquisitive tribunal and running the risk of losing political support.
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antitrust systems rest. The first phase should emphasize the
construction of the new agency, the development of its physical
and human capital, the training of judges, and the education of
consumers, business operators, and government officials in the
rationale for and content of the antitrust statute. In the second
phase, the agency would begin pursuing an enforcement agenda that concentrates on redressing readily proven, publiclyimposed impediments to rivalry.

